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1  Introduction and brief literature review 
The pattern of economic development adopted by India was essentially based on 
centralized planning with a predominant role played by the public sector, in the absence 
of sufficiently developed corporate industrial and banking systems as well as an 
efficient market system to foster growth of secondary and tertiary activities. While there 
had been some private initiatives in the industrial scene, participation of private banks 
and institutions in the financial market was dismal. Public sector banks and financial 
institutions accounted for nearly 75-80 per cent of financial intermediation in India. At 
this point, the process of economic development in India crucially hinged on captive 
investments in government securities by the public financial institutions, and on direct 
lending to the public sector units following recommendations of the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI). Rates of interest on government debt were administered and the rate of 
interest on central bank financing was hugely subsidized. At the same time, exposure to 
foreign capital was limited. 
Over-reliance on public sector financial intermediation largely hindered the growth of 
both equity and debt markets for corporate financing in India. Since the early 1990s, 
however, significant structural changes in the Indian capital market, particularly in the 
equity market, have enhanced Indian firms’ flexibility in choosing their capital structure 
optimally. Despite such changes, the corporate debt market in India, as in many other 
developing countries, has not developed sufficiently. In this context, one must also take 
note of the fact that debt instruments, ranging from fixed deposits, debentures to 
convertible debentures and so on, are considered to be cheaper sources of finance in 
view of the tax advantage on interest payments. Given this perspective, in this paper, we 
intend to empirically investigate an important question that has critical bearing on the 
performance of the financial system in India and yet not dealt with in the literature so 
far. As an analytical prelude, we first focus on the macroeconomic and institutional 
prerequisites necessary for the development of a sound domestic debt market in India, 
particularly the development of the primary and secondary debt markets, and 
subsequently explain why the volume of trade is meagre in the secondary market. We 
then test for the pattern of debt-equity choice by Indian firms during the post financial 
liberalization period in India and identify several factors that may have strong influence 
on a firm’s choice of participation in the corporate debt market. This should provide 
adequate inferences to researchers and policymakers interested in understanding the 
lopsided performance of the Indian corporate debt market and focusing on the 
underlying factors that might eventually correct the distortions, if any exist. 
A segment of the financial market, which has for long remained almost completely 
unregulated and therefore highly risky, is the non-government bond market. Although 
the volumes in this market have been growing steadily, the development of the market 
continues to be lopsided. Especially, the secondary market continues to lack liquidity 
although the volumes of primary issues have grown exponentially. Almost all the issues 
in this non-government securities market (in other words, corporate bond market) are by 
way of private placements. While the aggregate value of primary issues in corporate 
debt grew from about Rs.120 billion in 1995-96 to Rs.530 billion in 2002-03 the   2
proportion of issues through the public issue route declined from 22.6 per cent of the 
total issues in 1995-96 to 8.8 per cent of the total in 2002-03.1 
Under the circumstances, issuers have increasingly preferred to resort to the private 
placement mechanism rather than transparent public issue route. However, there seems 
to be no reliable estimates of the outstanding stock of privately placed debt. By 
alternative measurements, the total outstanding stock of privately placed corporate 
bonds is estimated at around Rs.2000 billion. By any reasonable standards this is a fairly 
large market and problems in such a market can easily have destabilizing effects of a 
serious nature to the entire financial sector. 
Traditionally, the debt market has been an institutional market all over the world. Banks 
and financial institutions contribute more in terms of trading volume. Many of these 
investors are also issuers of debt instruments. The small number of large players has 
resulted in the debt markets being fairly concentrated and evolving into a wholesale and 
negotiated dealings market. Most of the debt issues are privately placed or auctioned to 
participants. Secondary market transactions take place through telephonic negotiations 
among the market participants. 
It might be instructive at this stage to delineate that the relative trading intensity in the 
corporate bond market in India is also much smaller than in the case of government 
securities or equities. The daily secondary market trading in the corporate bonds is 
placed around Rs.3-4 billion although since early November 2003 the volumes have 
fallen significantly after the new regulations imposed by the Security and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI), according to which, disclosures need to be made at the time of 
issuing the bond and during subsequent trading on the exchanges. This is accompanied 
by the RBI’s new regulations on investments in non-statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) 
instruments/securities by banks. The relatively low trading intensity in corporate debt 
instruments is also indicative of the fact that this market is relatively underdeveloped 
and suffers from some infirmities. 
Generally speaking, the trading intensity in the debt market around the world is always 
significantly higher than that of the equities, owing to a number of reasons. It is 
established that bonds are bought and sold by the investors for basically two reasons. 
The first motive for trade is to deploy funds in safe and remunerative fixed income 
instruments keeping in view their relative risk–reward nature. Debt oriented mutual 
funds, for example, invest in bonds to offer a reasonable rate of return for those who 
invest in the debt mutual funds. Such mutual funds trade in bonds whenever they need 
to reshuffle their portfolios or have to meet redemption demand from the investors. The 
open-ended debt funds have to enter into buy/sell transactions depending on the inflow 
and outflow of investor funds. There are also long-term investors in bonds such as trusts 
or households in search of a steady rate of return on their investible surpluses. However, 
the much more important factor influencing secondary market transactions in bonds is 
the management of temporary or short-term liquidity. All those with fluctuating levels 
                                                 
1   For earlier work on the corporate debt market in India, see Mohan (2000), Thorat (2000, 2002), 
Leonardo (2000) and Patil (2004). For relations between financial liberalization and aggregate debt 
intensity, see Bhaduri (2000). Babu and Jain (2000) examine the significance of industry class in 
designing capital structure between debt-equity ratios. A cross-country analysis for the Asian 
countries is available in Harwood (2000).   3
of liquidity requirements prefer to invest temporarily idle funds in liquid bonds so that 
such funds earn a reasonable rate of return. A brief overview of the state of the 
corporate debt market, as it exists in India presently, is provided below. 
Now, the debt market in India comprises of two main segments: government securities 
market and corporate securities market. It is the former that dominates the market in 
terms of outstanding issues, market capitalization and trading volume; it sets the 
benchmark for the rest of the market. The main instruments in the government securities 
market are dated securities that include floating rate bonds, zero-coupon bonds, 
securities with embedded derivatives, and treasury bills and state government bonds. 
The corporate debt segment includes private corporate debt: debentures, fixed deposits, 
commercial papers, bonds issued by public sector units, infrastructure-related 
institutions, and bonds issued by development financial institutions. During 2002-03 the 
total amount raised through primary issues in the debt market stood at Rs.2,350,956 
million, which is an increase of 15 per cent over the previous year (see Table 1). Out of 
this 77.4 per cent was raised by the government while the rest was raised by the 
corporate sector through public and private placements.  
The government securities form the oldest and the most dominant segment of the debt 
market in India. The major investors of the government securities are the banks, the 
insurance companies, primary dealers and financial institutions. Historically the banks 
and other financial institutions were forced to invest in government securities due to 
SLR. In this way a captive market for government securities emerged that helped the 
government to appropriate a sizable amount of funds at a very low rate of interest. In the 
post reform period (i.e. since 1991) a number of measures taken, notably a market-
determined rate of interest, have totally reversed the scenario. As a matter of fact, the 
banking sector presently invests by 12 per cent more in government securities over and 
above the SLR requirement, which now stands at 25 per cent. 
Apart from the central and state government securities, various public sector units, 
development financial institute and the infrastructure related institutions also raise funds 
through bond issues. However, a major portion is raised through private placement. The 
major subscribers in this segment are banks, financial institutions and other corporates. 
 
Table 1 Primary issues market (Rs. million) 
Issuer 2001-02  2002-03 
Government 1,525,080  1,819,790   
(77%) 
Corporate 515,610  531,166 
(23%) 
Total 2,040,690  2,350,956 
Source: ISMR (2004) 
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Table 2 Turnover in secondary market (Rs. million) 
Security 2001-02  2002-03 
Government 1,5738,927  1,9557,312 
Corporate 197,289 360,388 
Total 15,936,216  19,917,700 
Source: ISMR (2004) 
 
It should also be noted that the Indian private corporate sector raises a large part of their 
financial requirements through bank loans. Other than this, they rely on debt issues, 
which comprises of bonds and commercial papers. Most of the bond issues are routed 
through private placement – around 93 per cent during 2003-03. It is argued that there 
are several inherent advantages of relying on private placement. It is both cost and time 
effective and is tailor-made to meet the needs of the investors in terms of interest 
payments and redemption. Moreover, it does not require detailed compliance with 
formalities as required for public and rights issues. The latter may be a source of many 
unscrupulous activities of the issuers. It is often commented that the private placement 
is crowding out public issues. 
In recent times a number of innovations have taken place in the corporate bond market, 
such as securitized products, corporate bond strips and a variety of floating rate 
instruments with floors and caps and bonds with embedded put and call options. 
However the secondary market has not yet developed in the debt segment of the Indian 
capital market. As is evident from Table 2 the aggregate turnover in the secondary 
market rose by 25 per cent compared to that in the previous year, while the trade in 
corporate securities accounts for a meagre 1.81 per cent. 
There is another, albeit less dominant, segment in the debt market, namely, short term 
paper issued by banks, mostly in the form of certificates of deposits. The Indian debt 
market also has a large, non-securitised, transactions-based segment comprising of call 
and notice money markets, an inter-bank market for term money, a market for inter-
corporate loans and a market for ready forward deals (repos). The players in this market 
segment are able to lend and borrow amongst themselves. 
Perhaps, the most important reason for lack of development of a healthy corporate bond 
market in India during the last decade appears to be unwillingness, until recently, on the 
part of the market regulator to play a proactive role in its development. After the 
securities scam hit the Indian financial markets in 1991-92, there have been several 
significant initiatives for upgrading the quality of the market, through development of 
infrastructure and the regulatory framework. These apply both to the equity market and 
the government securities market in India. However, despite such palpable attempts in 
related markets, the corporate debt market failed to attract sufficient attention from the 
market regulator, namely, the SEBI. The National Stock Exchange (NSE) on its part has 
attempted to encourage growth of the corporate debt market by providing the necessary 
trading and settlement infrastructure; but its efforts did not yield the desired results 
because there is no regulatory compulsion on the market intermediaries to direct their 
transactions to the exchange trading and settlement system.   5
As per the Securities Contracts Regulation Act 1956, the regulatory powers in respect of 
the equity markets (including equity-based derivatives) and corporate debt market vest 
fully with SEBI. While SEBI did take considerable interest in continually upgrading the 
quality of its regulatory and surveillance framework in respect of the equity and equity-
based derivatives markets, it showed scant interest with regard to the corporate debt 
market. The first important circular issued by SEBI on market dealings in corporate 
bonds was on 14 September 1999 when it banned all negotiated deals in listed corporate 
debt securities and made it mandatory for all the members of stock exchanges to execute 
all deals in corporate bonds on the order matching screen of the stock exchanges just as 
in the case of equities. 
However, SEBI failed to follow up its directive in ensuring that the corporate bond 
market becomes transparent and adopts an efficient price discovery process. Brokers 
evaded the SEBI directive by taking shelter under the guidelines regarding the spot 
deals (that is, deals taking place outside the stock exchanges), which are required to be 
settled in 48 hours and are outside the purview of the stock exchange regulations. 
Available data on transactions in corporate debt reported to NSE and the deals in 
corporate debt settled in National Securities Depository Ltd. (NSDL) indicate that only 
a small proportion of the deals are reported to the NSE. During the six month period 
January-July 2002 only about 27.7 per cent of the deals in corporate debt settled in 
NSDL were actually reported to NSE. What is more significant is that hardly any of 
these deals were actually matched on NSE’s order matching system. Thus the SEBI 
directives were totally ignored by the market. Despite this SEBI did not deem fit to pull 
up concerned brokers or take any action against them. All these years, market players 
have been ignoring the SEBI directive for the simple reason that they did not anticipate 
any punitive action; there was a general impression in the market that SEBI itself was 
not serious about disciplining the secondary market in corporate debt. 
In summary, therefore, existing deficiencies in the secondary debt market in India are as 
follows: 
i)  There are strong entry barriers to participate in trading of government 
securities. Like equity markets everybody should have access to market 
participation. Trades are negotiated bilaterally over telephones or by negotiated 
dealing settlements. The enforcement of such trades is difficult as they are in 
the nature of ‘over the counter’. 
ii)  Another deficiency of the market is that the market as such has no liquidity. 
The parties have to search for counter parties and negotiate the best price. 
Though the NSE introduced automated screen based trading, which is an 
automated order matching system, the banks and the financial institutions (who 
are the major players) showed little interest. Regulatory fiat is needed to 
enforce transparency in financial deals. Anonymity in trading is a necessary 
condition for the market to function competitively. The knowledge of parties 
affects the terms of trade and can lead to cartel formation. The market is not 
transparent; only the parties who trade have information about the trade. 
iii)  Finally, and yet no less importantly, the market remains highly fragmented. 
While these stated conditions prevail and necessitate need for further reforms, a host of 
reformatory policies had nonetheless been announced earlier. The reforms initiated by 
the RBI and the government of India in the debt market recently include:   6
—  setting up of a comprehensive system of primary dealers, 
—  adoption of a Delivery Versus Payment (DVP) system for settlement of 
government securities transactions, 
—  abolition of tax deduction at source on government securities, 
—  permitting Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) to invest in debt instruments 
including government stock and allowing them to hedge their foreign currency 
risk in the forward market, 
—  introduction of Treasury bills of varying maturities, and 
—  placing investments of banks in preference shares/debentures/bonds of 
corporates outside the 5 per cent limit. 
In a bid to increase transparency in operations, the RBI has been disseminating 
information on its transactions in gilts and publishing the calendar of auctions in respect 
of Treasury bills and repos. Soon, the RBI proposes to publish data on banks’ 
investments in corporate and Public Sector Units (PSU) debt in the ‘Weekly Statistical 
Supplement’ to the RBI Bulletin. To foster inter-institutional coordination, a Technical 
Advisory Committee for government securities and a Standing Committee on Money 
Market have been set up. Major issues confronting the debt and money markets are 
discussed in these committees. These committees have been found to be useful by all 
participants. 
Based on these specifications, we formulate the agenda for research and propose to 
investigate the following issues. 
An econometric model for the financing pattern of Indian firms will be formulated with 
proximate determinants used for most other developing countries. In this context, 
competing theories for debt-equity choice of firms based on tax advantage of debt over 
equities and the pecking order theory a la Myers and Majluf (1984) can be tested. We 
will use a comprehensive database of Indian firms for the period 1992-93 to 2002-03 
compiled by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). 
It has been observed that the Indian corporate sector resorted to equity financing in a 
booming stock market between 1991 and 1995-96. Thereafter they rely more on debt, 
primarily in the form of bank loans, for financing their investment projects. However, 
they also raise money by means of other debt instruments such as debenture, fixed 
deposits and commercial papers. The latter has been popular in recent times particularly 
as a short-term debt instrument. The fact that firms resorted to equity financing in a 
booming stock market can be ascribed to the fact that in such situations firms can raise 
more funds with lesser dilution of the existing shareholding pattern. On the other hand, 
when the share market is low, firms prefer debt as the means of financing as equity 
becomes costlier in terms of the dilution of shares. Thus the firms take advantage of a 
positive ‘bubble’ in the stock market, if there be any, for financing its investment 
projects (see Chirinko and Schaller 2001). This does not support the pecking order 
hypothesis. However, this phenomenon will depend to a large extent on firm-specific 
characteristics in addition to the general stock market situation, because all firms cannot 
equally get the benefit of a booming stock market. 
Based on the existing observations, we formulate an econometric model that addresses 
the issue of private versus public placement in the debt market. Prima facie it appears   7
that the firms envisage high transaction cost of public placement, which is further 
influenced by many firm-specific factors. It is further argued that one of the other 
reasons why firms prefer private placements is the lack of stringent disclosure norms 
associated with this form. Looking at the history of capital issues of firms for the period 
1992-93 to 2002-03 we address this issue in an econometric model. 
2  Data, model and results 
First, we provide a brief discussion of the factors that determine a firm’s capital 
structure, and that which we have used in the following econometric model. Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) earlier hypothesize that a firm’s leverage is uncorrelated with its 
market value under a perfectly complete capital market. However, there is extensive 
literature explaining that each firm can have a different optimal capital structure 
minimizing capital cost in the real world, where there exist bankruptcy costs, agency 
costs, asymmetric information and incompleteness in product and factor markets.2 
The determinants of debt structure given particular emphasis in earlier theoretical and 
empirical studies include firm size, growth rate, size of tangible fixed assets, 
profitability and industry classification.3 In addition we also incorporate the age of the 
firm as calculated from its date of incorporation and whether it is listed either in the 
NSE or in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). In fact, our empirical results are based 
on observations on 450 firms listed in either of these stock exchanges, during a period 
of 12 years between 1992 and 2003. 
We propose two dependent variables in order to observe the effect of a set of 
explanatory variables on them, separately. The first one is termed DEBTINTO and 
calculated as the sum of Fixed Deposits, Commercial Papers and Debentures, which are 
elements of the total borrowing of a firm. The alternative dependent variable is more 
traditionally defined as Leverage and calculated as the ratio of Total Debt and Total 
Asset at the firm level. The purpose behind such alternative measures is to providing a 
more comprehensive analysis of the issue at hand: the determination of the corporate 
debt structure in India. 
Description of the variables and the descriptive statistics 
Tables 3–6 describe the panel data, which is extracted from the CMIE database. The 
data covers a period of 12 years, between 1992-2003 for 450 firms sorted from a group 
of 653 firms on the basis of listing information at the NSE and BSE. We next offer a 
description of the data, which includes detailed descriptive statistics (Table 3), a 
variance-covariance matrix (Table 4) and a correlation matrix (Table 5). Outcomes of 
the panel regression are provided later in Table (6) and a detailed description of the data 
given below. 
                                                 
2   For recent survey papers on the theory of determination of optimal financial structure of firms, see 
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) also providing an empirical estimate. 
3   Important empirical studies regarding the determinants of the firm’s capital structure include, Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1994).   8
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean  Std dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Minimum  Maximum  No. of obs 
SHARE_PRI 103.305  266.794  13.1232 249.988  0.27  6876.06  5237 
LOGSALES 2.06022  0.697816  -0.106934 3.75682  -1.69897  4.87178  5388 
SALES_GR 18.4623  195.29  47.0849  2357.32 -96.0971  10585.7  4937 
NETSALES 1.05347  0.534085  1.54642  9.39005 -0.00090886  5.84082  5388 
NFATOTAA 0.432907  0.231221  1.97379  15.278 0.00570994  2.76407  5388 
LONG_TER 127.815  577.437  14.3578 289.414  0  16780.2  5388 
AGE 31.1414  21.4679  1.21103 4.16249  1  124  5388 
 
a  Sales growth (SALES_GR) 
Equity holders in highly leveraged firms may choose not to invest in projects that would 
help increase the firm’s value, if they consider that, while they bear the entire cost of the 
investment, the returns from the investment are captured mainly by the debt-holders 
(Myers 1977). If this agency cost of debts is significant, fast-growing firms operating in 
highly lucrative businesses would tend to have more equity and less debt financing. 
Therefore, the firm with higher growth opportunities has lower leverage, especially in 
terms of long-term debts. This suggests that short-term debt ratios might be positively 
related to growth rates if growing firms reduce their agency cost by substituting short-
term liabilities for long-term ones (Titman and Wessels 1988). 
b Age 
If the age of the firm as calculated from the date of incorporation provides a positive 
influence on the firms’ attitude towards high leverage or a high debt component in total 
borrowing, it should imply high credit-worthiness of the firm. 
Table 4 Variance covariance matrix 
Variables SHAREPRI  LOGSALES SALES_GRNETSALES NFATOTAA LONG_TER  AGE 
SHARE_PRI 73975.4  31.3688  -358.933 3.5804 -4.35924 6305.09  764.276 
LOGSALES 31.3688  0.479796 -0.793323 0.0679571 -0.00719788 153.851 4.82355 
SALES_GR -358.933 -0.793323  38811.9 0.358854 0.57731  428.666 -185.708 
NETSALES 3.5804 0.0679571  0.358854  0.283665 -0.0344321 -44.3804  1.56946 
NFATOTAA -4.35924  -0.00719788 0.57731 -0.0344321 0.0527382 16.24 -0.662776 
LONG_TER 6305.09  153.851  428.666 -44.3804  16.24  349937 1024.56 
AGE 764.276  4.82355  -185.708  1.56946 -0.662776 1024.56 461.782 
   9
Table 5 Correlation matrix 
  AGE  SHAREPRI LONG_TER NETSALES LOGSALES  SALGR  NFATOTAA SALESGFA 
AGE 1.00000  0.13321  0.08333 0.14260 0.33610  -0.00971 -0.14081  0.05199 
SHARE_PRI 0.13321  1.00000  0.04050  0.02437 0.16425  -0.01202  -0.06680 0.02869 
LONG_TER 0.08333  0.04050  1.00000  -0.14092 0.37307  -0.00449  0.11853 -0.07769 
NETSALES 0.14260  0.02437  -0.14092  1.00000 0.18085  0.03472  -0.29228  0.51307* 
LOGSALES 0.33610  0.16425  0.37307  0.18085 1.00000  -0.01164  -0.05072 0.09668 
SALES_GR -0.00971  -0.01202  -0.00449  0.03472 -0.01164  1.00000  -0.00537 0.02634 
NFATOTAA -0.14081  -0.06680  0.11853  -0.29228 -0.05072  -0.00537  1.00000 -0.43005 
SALESGFA 0.05199  0.02869  -0.07769  0.51307* 0.09668  0.02634  -0.43005 1.00000 
Note:   We drop one of the variables for our regression analysis in the presence of high correlation (*) 
between two variables (correlation coefficient > 0.5).  
 
c Share  price  (SHARE_PRI) 
Whether a firm chooses corporate debt as an important means of financing may also 
depend on its status in the stock exchange. Thus, we allow for the share price of each 
firm as an explanatory variable to observe if it should have any positive and significant 
effect on the borrowing pattern (debt) of the firm. 
d Fixed  assets 
The variable we actually use is defined as NFATOTAA (net fixed assets/total assets). 
The asset structure of a firm significantly affects the firm’s capital structure. Since 
tangible fixed assets, serving as collateral, can lower the risk of the lender suffering the 
agency cost of debt, a greater portion of tangible fixed assets on the balance sheet leads 
to higher leverage. Grossman and Hart (1982), however, show that a firm’s tangible 
fixed assets can be negatively correlated with its leverage. According to them, a firm 
with limited tangible fixed assets has less collateralized debts and more difficulty 
monitoring the extravagancy of its employees because of asymmetric information. In 
this case, a firm can attempt to reduce its agency costs by increasing leverage, which 
allows the firm to be more stringently monitored by creditors such as bondholders and 
financial intermediaries. Therefore, a firm with limited tangible fixed assets can raise its 
leverage. In addition, if the company has huge tangible fixed assets, then the proportion 
of fixed operating costs, instead of flexible operating costs, in the total operating costs 
for the firm’s production and sales activities increases, thus raising its operational risk 
and probability of bankruptcy. In this case, an increase in tangible fixed assets can also 
lead to lower leverage. If an increase in tangible fixed assets raises a firm’s bankruptcy 
such as the cost of asset sales, the firm’s leverage could also be lowered.   10
e  Size of the firm (LOGSALES, NETSALES)  
The size of a firm is closely related to leverage since it affects the firm’s risk of default 
and bankruptcy costs. As a firm becomes big and diversifies its operations, the risk of 
default decreases; therefore, it has better access to external financing, which might 
result in high leverage. Direct bankruptcy costs also influence a firm’s leverage: large-
scale firms can have higher leverage since bankruptcy costs account for a smaller 
portion of their capital (Titman and Wessels 1988). Large firms are likely to obtain 
long-term loans more easily, since they have lower default risks and more assets to put 
up as collateral, compared with smaller firms. On the other hand, large firms can easily 
finance their investments directly from capital markets because asymmetric information 
is less likely to occur as outside investors can obtain more information about large firms 
than about small-sized firms. This allows larger firms to have lower leverage. 
f Industry  classification  (INDDUMMY) 
Unique features of a certain industry also affect the debt structures of the firms in that 
industry. Each industry may have industry-specific patterns of financing because of 
disparities in product market structure and types of competitive actions between firms. 
To control for these industry effects, many empirical studies include dummies for 
industry. We classify the firms in the sample into 48 industry categories, as per the SIC 
code used in India. The industry dummy is chosen as INDDUMMY =1, if  40 ≥ SIC , 
and = 0 otherwise. As we shall discuss, other categorization does not offer any 
meaningful result. 
g.  Long-term borrowing (LONG_TER) 
We include long-term borrowing as one of the explanatory variables since a firms 
borrowing pattern and time preference may strongly influence its credit-worthiness. 
Consequently, the structure may be used to observe if firms that use long-term 
borrowing would also have a high leverage and if the component of debt in total 
borrowing would also be high for these firms. 
The Model 
The empirical result is based on the following formulation that uses the explanatory 
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1 α α ,   where,   i= 1, 2, K, T   (I) 
where,  it Y is the dependent variable pooling N cross-sectional observations and T time-
series observations, and  s X Kit'  are the independent variables pooling N cross-sectional 
observations and T time-series observations.  1 α  is a constant term and  it e  is random 
error with mean 0 and variance 
2 σ . Evidently, we use a Panel Regression for carrying 
out this analysis. 
Use of the panel data as described above, enables us to consider both the cross-sectional 
and time-series characteristics of our sample and helps to identify the sources of the   11
effects, which, as far as some of the earlier studies are concerned, appear mixed. With 
the panel data set, equation (I) can be estimated by means of Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) techniques. However, assumptions concerning the constant term  1 α  in the 
estimation equation dictate the choice of estimation methods. If  1 α  varies over time 
(year by year), it can be re-written as  t μ α α + = 1 1 , where,  1 α  is a constant term and 
t μ denotes the time-specific fixed effect. In that case, the equation becomes a fixed-
effect model, which can now be estimated using the OLS method by incorporating year 
dummies. Our empirical investigation includes two different cases, one with fixed  1 α  
and the other with the time specific fixed effect. The year dummy variable is used when 
the time-specific effect is assumed. However, as we shall see shortly, all the equations 
that we estimate indicate the existence of a Fixed Effect model.  
Therefore, the empirical model for this study is as follows, where we propose two 
different sets of equations to be estimated based on the two models discussed above: 
it h SalesGrowt Netsales Logsales NFATOTAA
Longterm Shareprice Age DEBTINTO
ε α α α α
α α α α
+ + + + +
+ + + =
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1  (II) 
it mmy IndustryDu
h SalesGrowt Netsales Logsales NFATOTAA
Longterm Shareprice Age LEVERAGE
ε α
α α α α
α α α α
+ +
+ + + +
+ + + + =
9
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1
 (III) 
Panel estimation results 
For the first model, we attempt to identify and explain the factors behind corporate debt 
holdings by a company in its total borrowing (henceforth, DEBTINTO). The results are 
reported in Table 6. In fact, we regress five sets of equations with DEBTINTO as a 
function of: Age, Shareprice, Longterm borrowing, NFATOTAA, Logsales, Netsales, 
and SalesGrowth—variables and expected signs as discussed above. Notably, all the 
results obtained under this specification recommend one-way fixed effect model on the 
basis of the Hausman test statistic. Equation (1) in Table 6 for example uses most of 
these explanatory variables except NFATOTAA and SALES_GR, which were dropped. 
The reported R
2 is 0.84 (Table 6, column 10) and LONG_TER borrowing (at 1 per cent) 
and NETSALES (at 5 per cent) turn out to be positive and significant factors in 
explaining the debt component in total borrowing for the group of 450 firms. Although 
non-significant, AGE as an explanatory variable affects DEBTINTO negatively and this 
pattern continues for all the other equations specified subsequently. In other words, it 
turns out that, AGE either does not affect the choice of the debt structure of a firm 
significantly, or even if it does, the effect is negative, such that, more the age of a firm 
the lower is the tendency that it will use corporate debt as a means of finance. 
Subsequently, equation (2) in Table 6, estimates DEBTINTO by dropping Net Sales as 
a variable and including NFATOTAA, and the model loses significant explanatory 
variables, since LONG_TER alone now offers a positive and significant coefficient. 
Similarly, equations (3, 4 and 5) add and drop variables to see if the model offers a  
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Table 6 Panel regressions 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10  11  12 
Eqn No.  Eqn  AGE  SHARE_PRI  LONG_TER  NFATOTAA LOGSALES NETSALES SALES_GR INDUMMY  R
2 AIC LA 
-0.178 0.0072  0.4999  -14.389 13.327  DEBT INTO 
(-0.284) -0.999 (76.662*) 
 
(-1.436) (2.035**) 
   0.844  12.552  9.715 
-0.0022 -0.00023  0.0000135  -0.0145  -0.011 
1 
LEVERAGE 
(-8.08*) (-0.769)  (5.134*) 
 
(-3.591*) (-4.271*) 
   0.596  -3.1  -5.91 
-0.453 0.662  0.499 -28.542 -9.36  DEBT INTO 
(-0.753) -0.913 (76.691*)  (-1.871) (-1.005) 
      0.844 12552 9.715 
-0.0028 -0.000003  0.00001  0.0094  -0.01 
2 
LEVERAGE 
(-13.991*) (-1.269)  (4.619*)  -1.551  (-5.981*) 
     0.595  -3.1  -5.91 
-0.755 0.006  0.499 -22.617  8.15  DEBT INTO 
(-1.532) -0.821 (77.263*)  (-1.493) 
 
-1.348 
   0.844  12.552  9.715 
(-) 0.002  (-) 0.00003  0.001  0.009  (-) 0.01 
3 
LEVERAGE 
(-14.7*) (-1.7)  (3.5*)  -1.7 
 
(-6.9*) 
   0.56  -3.1  -5.91 
-0.214 0.0071  0.499  -14.367 14.921 -0.002  DEBT INTO 
(-0.34) -0.988 (76.648*) 
 
(-1.433) (2.032**) (-0.229) 
 0.844  12.553  9.715 
-0.0022 -5  0.00001  -0.01 -0.011  -0.000003 
4 
LEVERAGE 
(-8.843*) (-0.791)  (5.073*) 
 
(3.405*) (-4.176*) (-0.103) 
 0.596  -3.1  -5.91 




   0.685  12.552  9.715 




   
(-4.056*) (-2.882**) 
 0.593  -3.1  -5.91 
-0.002 -0.000002  0.000001  -0.01  -0.00004  6 LEVERAGE 
(-13.1*) (-1.2)  (3.5*) 
  
(-6.9*) (-2.3*) 
 0.56  -3.1  -5.91 
-0.002 -0.000005  0.000001  0.009  -0.01  -0.00004  -0.002  7 LEVERAGE 
(-13.9*) (-1.28)  (4.6*)  -1.53 
 
(-5.9*) (-2.5**)  (-3.6*) 
0.56 -3.1 -5.91 
-0.001 -0.00001 0.00001  0.008  -0.01  -0.00005  8 LEVERAGE 
(-7.9*) (-0.45)  (3.9*)  -1.7  (-4.9*) 
 
(-1.2) 
 0.57  -3.1  -5.91 
Notes ** Significant at 1% level, * Significant at 5% level. 
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better insight into the factors that affect the choice of a firm’s debt structure 
significantly. All of these equations, however, return a high goodness of fit   
(R
2  = 0.84), except equation (5), where R
2 drops to 0.68. For equation (5), we dropped 
LONG_TER and included NETSALES along with AGE, SHARE_PRI and 
LOGSALES and observe that while LOGSALES become positive and highly 
significant (Table 6, column 6), NETSALES becomes negative though significant. This 
denotes a reversal of sign for both LOGSALES (negative so far) and NETSALES 
(positive so far) compared to all the previous equations where these variables have been 
picked for estimating DEBTINTO. At the same time however, AGE reports a positive 
coefficient unlike in all the previous cases. We believe that the system becomes unstable 
if LONG_TER is dropped from the analysis, despite the fact that LONG_TER and 
LOGSALES display some degree of correlation (0.37), which is however, not surprising 
because long term borrowing of a firm is often associated with buy-back options offered 
by the financer. This furthermore, explains the negative (albeit, non-significant) 
coefficient reported by LOGSALES, since sales growth in this case reduces the 
possibility that the firm chooses corporate debt as a mode of financing. 
The second model used in this analysis is based on equation (III) and the results are also 
reported in Table 6. As already mentioned, the dependent variable for this Panel 
regression is LEVERAGE and defined as the proportion of firm's total domestic debt to 
total assets. Once again, we offer a number of cases, where, we drop and insert 
variables in favour of obtaining the most appropriate combination that explains a firm’s 
LEVERAGE best. The Hausman test for these equations recommends the one-way 
fixed effect model as in the previous case. Therefore, we begin with equation (1), where 
LEVERAGE is a function of AGE, SHARE_PRI, LONG_TER, LOGSALES and 
NETSALES. Of these, AGE reports a small negative (-0.0022) but highly significant  
(t = -8.08) coefficient. While SHARE_PRI continues to display little impact on the 
choice and volume of the financing pattern of a firm, the variable LONG_TER reports a 
positive (though very small) and highly significant coefficient. In this respect, there is 
not much difference with the previous case, although, the coefficient values are 
substantially greater for DEBTINTO. Finally, both LOGSALES and NETSALES offer 
negative and significant relationship with LEVERAGE, which implies that the firms do 
not choose corporate debt as a mode of financing in the presence of high sales. In other 
words, stated more simply, a bad sales performance may be thought of as an indicator 
that the firm goes into high indebtedness. 
The pattern observed here, continues for the remaining seven equations reported in 
Table 6. Additionally, we have included SALES_GR as an explanatory variable in 
equation (4) in the presence of LONG_TER and LOGSALES and it reports a low 
negative and non-significant coefficient. However, when both LONG_TER and 
LOGSALES are dropped from equation (5), the coefficient of SALES_GR increases 
and becomes significant at the 5 per cent level. Finally, equation (7) uses the industry 
dummy variable (INDDUMMY) discussed above. In fact, we have specified the dummy 
variable for the industrial categories around several possible options, such as, 
INDDUMMY = 1, if  25 ≥ SIC  or,  30 ≥ SIC  and = 0, otherwise, none of which 
retrieved any meaningful result. The choice of  40 ≥ SIC , however, shows that, the 
higher the industrial classification type, the lower is the possibility that the firm enters 
into high LEVERAGE.   14
3 Concluding  remarks 
The corporate debt market in India has historically demonstrated poor participation 
from the firms. Despite a substantial increase (from Rs.197,287 million in 2001-02 to 
Rs.360,388 million in 2002-03) in the secondary market turnover through issue of 
corporate debt, it remains a rather small fraction of the total turnover, with the 
transaction through the government securities still overwhelming. Although it is often 
argued that transaction in the corporate debt market in India might be the source of 
many unscrupulous activities since it is mostly through private placements (93 per cent) 
and lack sufficient control and supervision by the regulatory authority, there is little 
doubt that it is a cheaper option for the firms to raise capital through this market. 
In spite of the well-known attributes associated with it, and that which has led many 
firms in the newly industrialized countries, as also in the USA and Europe, to have 
vigorously routed their financing pattern through the corporate debt market, the scope 
and activities appear rather narrow in India. This paper, therefore, investigates the firm 
level conditions in India and tries to identify the factors that strongly influence a firm’s 
participation in the corporate debt market. In the process, we choose a number of 
variables that are known to affect a firm’s choice of financing pattern. These include, 
the age of the firm, the level of long-term borrowing, share prices, the ratio of net fixed 
assets and total assets, the size of the firm as captured through its sales figures and 
through the growth of sales, and so on. Evidence at the country-level identifies 
LEVERAGE (proportion of firm's total domestic debt to total assets) as an important 
dependent variable in observing the impact of the above-mentioned explanatory 
variables on the firm’s choice of financing through the corporate debt market. However, 
in addition to LEVERAGE, we define another dependent variable DEBTINTO 
(proportion of debt; which includes fixed deposits, commercial papers and debentures, 
in the total borrowing of a firm) and use this to compare the efficacies of these two 
dependent variables for a panel of 450 firms with an average of 5,300 observations per 
variable. 
The results display that among the set of variables chosen, Age displays a negative and 
non-significant impact on both the dependent variables, while Longterm borrowing 
continues to be positive and significant all through. For some equations (notably 1–4, in 
Table 6), Shareprice (though non-significant) and Netsales (significant) report alternate 
signs for DEBTINTO (positive) and LEVERAGE (negative). However, NFATOTAA 
and INDDUMMY turn out to be of little or no impact on DEBTINTO and 
LEVERAGE, except in equation (7), where, INDUMMY has a negative and significant 
impact on LEVERAGE. Finally, it is observed that SalesGrowth negatively and 
significantly explains the LEVERAGE of a firm when Long-term borrowing and 
LOGSALES are dropped from the analysis. 
Therefore, on the basis of these results we conclude that while LEVERAGE as the more 
accepted measure of a firm’s debt market participation depends crucially on the level of 
the firm’s long-term borrowing and sales performances, DEBTINTO as the other 
measure is also strongly influenced by the level of long-term borrowing and sales 
performance of the firm. However, since the explanatory variables return different signs 
for the two dependent variables, future policy propositions and reforms aimed at 
affecting positively or negatively the level of activity in the corporate debt market must 
take cognizance of such possibilities. Finally, therefore, this study provides some 
important observations on the factors that potentially influence a firm’s choice of   15
participation in the corporate debt market, which we believe should be valuable to 
researchers and policymakers who wish to look into the prospects of the corporate debt 
market in India deeper. 
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